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Debt policy under constraints:
Philip II, the Cortes, and
Genoese bankers1
By CARLOS ÁLVAREZ-NOGAL and CHRISTOPHE CHAMLEY*
Under Philip II, Castile was the first country with a large nation-wide domestic
public debt. A new view of that fiscal system is presented that is potentially relevant
for other fiscal systems in Europe before 1800.The credibility of the debt, mostly in
perpetual redeemable annuities, was enhanced by decentralized funding through
taxes administered by cities making up the Realm in the Cortes.The accumulation of
short-term debt depended on refinancing through long-term debt. Financial crises in
the short-term debt occurred when the service of the long-term debt reached the
revenues of its servicing taxes. They were not caused by liquidity crises and were
resolved after protracted negotiations in the Cortes by tax increases and interest rate
reductions.
K ing Philip II, as head of the first modern super-power, managed a budget ona scale that had not been seen since the height of the Roman Empire.2 No
state before had faced such extraordinary fluctuations and imbalances, both in
revenue and expenditure. Large military expenses were required by the politics of
Europe and the revolution in military technology. The variability in both revenue
and expenses, coupled with a large foreign component, was met by large public
borrowings up to modern levels, a historical innovation that, in later centuries,
would be followed by the Netherlands, France, and England. Like eighteenth-
century England, Castile (about 80 per cent of modern-day Spain) established its
military supremacy through its superior ability to mobilize large resources through
borrowing.
The debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded 50 per cent, according to some estimates, and
the ratio between interest service and tax revenues at the end of the century was
about 50 per cent, as it would be in England or France two centuries later.3 These
impressive numbers were achieved without a central administration to collect tax
* Author affiliations: Carlos Álvarez-Nogal, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Christophe Chamley, Boston
University and PSE.
1 We would like to thank Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Gilles Postel-Vinay, Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, Leandro
Prados de la Escosura, and the referees for their comments and suggestions. Financial support was received from
the HI-POD Project, European Commission’s Seventh Research Framework Programme and Ministry of
Economy and Competitiveness (Spain) HAR2012-39034-C03-02.
2 At 6 million ducats (the average around 1560), with a ducat at 35 grams of silver, it amounted to 210 tons
of silver per year with a population of about 5 million, while the Roman Empire’s budget was between 500 and
1,000 tons for a population of 50 million; Hopkins, ‘Rome’.The size of the monetized government revenues and
expenditures, per capita, had been small throughout the middle ages in western Europe; Bean, ‘War’.
3 Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, ‘Decline of Spain’, pp. 352–4.
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revenues and without a centralized capital market that could facilitate the man-
agement of the public debt.4
Under Philip II, four ‘defaults’ are alleged to have occurred, and these financial
crises have attracted considerable attention. We propose an interpretation of the
financial crises under Philip II that is totally new.These crises were not caused by
a ‘sudden stop’ from foreign bankers, by a problem of liquidity, or by the inability
of the Crown to raise sufficient revenues. Since the crises that took place con-
cerned loans with Genoese bankers, all previous studies have focused on relations
between the Crown and the bankers.We show that the cause of each of the crises
lay elsewhere, in the protracted negotiations about higher taxes that took place in
the Cortes between the Crown and the cities of Castile.
In a decentralized system with no central administration, the cities managed the
taxes that serviced the most secure component of the domestic debt, and these
taxes effectively put a ceiling on the domestic debt. Any significant accumulation
of loans with foreign bankers had to be converted eventually into domestic debt.
When the service of that debt reached the implicit ceiling imposed by the domestic
taxes, protracted negotiations had to take place between the Crown and the cities.
These negotiations triggered a suspension of payments by the Crown on the loans
with foreign bankers.
In our argument, the alleged defaults were part of a system that had efficient
properties in the institutional context. Our argument focuses on the economics,
but it also sheds some light on the political state of Castile, and on the develop-
ment of states and their finances in early modern Europe, especially for composite
monarchies of the kind exemplified by Castile.5
The public debt had been created and developed gradually by Italian cities since
the twelfth century.6 Within a city-state, a credible public debt could be issued
because debt holders had some control over the collection of taxes that would
service that debt.The Italian system was extended in the Netherlands under Philip
II’s father, Charles V: the state’s debt was issued through the cities that were part
of a central political regime.7 In this way, bondholders kept control of the revenues
that would service the debt. In Castile, that system was introduced by Charles V
and developed further under Philip II. The dominant part of the debt was the
domestic debt, called juros, and the main part of the juros was administered by
cities that controlled taxes. Hence, the lack of a central administration which
would control and enforce tax revenues did not diminish but reinforced the
capability of the Crown to borrow because it restricted its ability to divert tax
revenues away from servicing the debt.
The domestic debt provided collateral, either implicit or explicit, for the short-
term debt, the asientos, which could be converted into long-term juros. Following
the routine established in the previous century,8 the Crown converted any signifi-
cant accumulation of short-term debt into long-term domestic debt. Each city
contributed a fixed lump-sum amount per year that was established, by majority
4 In England, both the tax administration and capital markets developed only after the Glorious Revolution;
Brewer, Sinews; Dickson, Financial revolution.
5 This issue has been the subject of a number of important recent studies that cannot be summarized here.We
provide references on specific issues.
6 Pezzolo, ‘Government debts’.
7 Tracy, Financial revolution; Gelderblom and Jonker, ‘Public finance’.
8 Andrés Díaz, El último decenio.
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vote, at the meeting of 18 cities in the Cortes. Hence, the total contribution
established a de facto ceiling on the service of the public debt.When the domestic
debt grew and the ceiling was reached, the short-term debt could no longer be
converted into long-term debt and a crisis took place.This structure explains both
the existence of a large, credible domestic debt and the repeated crises.
Each of the three financial crises under Philip II (in 1557–60, 1575–7, and
1596–7) formally started when the Crown declared a suspension of payments on
short-term loan contracts, the asientos.9 However, each crisis occurred when the
service of the long-term debt reached the previously agreed-upon ceiling of the city
tax payments.10 The crises had no adverse effect on the long-term debt interest
rate, which declined during the century.
Previous works on the financial crises in sixteenth-century Castile fall into one
of two categories. The first category, favoured especially by economists, views
Castile as a modern state with central control over expenditures and revenues and
a budget policy that could be evaluated by aggregates according to International
Monetary Fund criteria.11 Some economists even interpret the so-called ‘defaults’
of the late sixteenth century as proper solvency crises that resulted from an
incompatibility of revenue-raising capacity and expenditure.12 More recently,
Drelichman andVoth, following earlier work byThompson and others, have shown
that solvency was never the issue, from the point of view of a centralized govern-
ment, but that instead these crises were liquidity crises followed by renegotiations
and a conversion of short-term loans into long-term bonds.13
We agree that solvency was not the issue, but we do not think that the crises
under Philip II were short-term liquidity crises.14 In a standard liquidity crisis,
lenders refuse to provide additional short-term lending or loan roll-overs.
However, each of the crises was not triggered by such a constraint but instead by
a suspension of payments declared by Philip II.The most important crisis, in 1575,
could have been avoided easily if Philip II had asked for a moderate increase of tax
revenues from the cities instead of embarking on a power play to triple these
revenues.
The second category of historical research on Spain follows Elliott in empha-
sizing the ‘composite’ nature of the state in which territories preserved most of
their political-administrative structure and historic freedoms.15 We support this
view and argue that relations between the Crown and the cities were directly
related to the dealings between the Crown and the Genoese bankers who provided
9 The two crises of 1557 and 1560 are actually two parts of the same crisis.
10 The process is reminiscent of the deadlock that almost took place in the summer of 2011 in the US between
the legislative and the executive branch of the government.
11 Lovett, ‘Castilian bankruptcy’; Conklin, ‘Theory of sovereign debt’; Drelichman and Voth, ‘Sustainable
debts’.
12 Reinhart and Rogoff, This time is different.
13 Drelichman and Voth, ‘Sustainable debts’; Thompson, ‘Castile’.
14 For example, the statement that ‘a compromise [between Philip II and the Cortes] emerged in 1575, too late
to prevent a default on short-term debt’ (Drelichman and Voth, ‘Sustainable debts’, p. 816) is contrary to
historical evidence of the protracted negotiations that we discuss in our detailed account of the 1575 crisis in
section V.
15 Elliott, ‘Europe’; Grafe, Distant tyranny; Artola, La Hacienda; Gelabert, La bolsa del rey; Sanz Ayán, ‘Pro-
cedimientos’; Tracy, Emperor CharlesV; Irigoin and Grafe, ‘Bargaining for absolutism’.
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short-term loans.16 In order to understand the financial crises it is important to
study both relationships at the same time.
In this article, we also provide a new description of the actual nature of the
financial crises under Philip II. Traditionally, the literature has labelled them
bankruptcies.17 Such a Procrustean classification neglects the historical features of
financial instruments in Castile and confuses interest reduction with debt reduc-
tion. Most of the domestic debt was in perpetual annuities redeemable at par (juros
al quitar): the Crown could repay the principal at any time. This feature had been
introduced in the fifteenth century and, by the end of that century, the Crown was
routinely using the redeemability of the annuities to lower their interest rate as the
market rate decreased gradually over the century. Each interest reduction was not
forced and included the provision that the debt holder could choose instead the
cash payment of the face value of the principal.
Although interest reductions were indeed conducted during the crisis resolu-
tions of 1575–7 and 1596–7, they were not defaults, as is often alleged. We
certainly do not deny that some of the debt was reduced, but we think that the
quoted amounts (for example, those given by Drelichman and Voth) are over-
stated.18 More work is needed on this issue, however.
The article is organized along the following lines. The backbone of the system,
the long-term domestic juros, is presented in section I. The funding of the juros is
analysed in Section II. Section III is devoted to the short-term debt, the asientos.
Section IV discusses principles of fiscal and debt policy under the constraint of a
quantum cost of adjusting taxes. A mathematical formulation of the fiscal problem
is beyond the scope of this article and could not do full justice, at this stage, to the
complexity of the interactions between the Crown, the cities, and the Genoese
bankers. In the context of a quantum cost of adjustment, some accumulation of
short-term debt can be efficient despite its higher cost, and it is entirely converted
into long-term debt when there is a tax adjustment. Indeed this actually occurred
under Philip II. In sectionV, each of the three crises is analysed in light of our main
argument.
I
The core of the fiscal system of Castile was its long-term debt. In order to
understand its funding mechanism and the interest reductions on the debt, it is
necessary to examine the financial instruments of this long-term debt, called juros.
They had been introduced in the twelfth century as pension rewards for services
during the Reconquista.19 Their marketability increased gradually over the centu-
ries. Given the stage of development and the institutions in the sixteenth century,
there was no central market with price quotations as, centuries later, there would
16 Historians have either specialized in the relations between the Crown and the Cortes (for example, Fortea
Pérez, Monarquía y Cortes), or in the relations between the Crown and the bankers (Carlos Morales, Felipe II, and
the cited literature).
17 Reinhart and Rogoff, This time is different.
18 A central point made by Drelichman andVoth is that Genoese bankers did rather well on their loans, ex post,
in spite of the debt reductions. Our argument about interest reduction reinforces their conclusion.
19 See Barthe Porcel, Los juros; Toboso Sánchez, La deuda pública; Pérez-Prendes and Torres López, Los juros.
4
be in the Netherlands and England. More importantly, in the political structure of
Castile, there could not be such a market.The juros were serviced at the city level
to ensure their credibility.Thus, for a juro issued in Seville, the coupons had to be
collected in Seville and not in Madrid.The same office would service the juros and
collect the local sales tax revenues on which the service of juros had first claim.
Juros were also ranked by local order of seniority according to their date of
issuance. No default took place on juros in the sixteenth century, but there could
be local delays of payment. Juros were traded and not attached to a particular
holder (transactions had to be registered).They were not homogeneous like the 3
or 4 per cent annuity found in eighteenth-century England, but they could be
traded throughout the entire realm.20
Juros were either perpetual and redeemable annuities (juros al quitar), or life
annuities (juros de por vida), which were also redeemable.21 Juros al quitar had a face
value, the principal, which could be paid back by the government at any time.The
redeemable feature enabled the government to reduce the debt in times of surplus
and to refinance when the interest rate decreased. Such interest reductions had
taken place in the fifteenth century, from 10 to 7 per cent and from 8 to 6 per cent.
At the same time, the Crown sold new juros at rates of 7 and 6 per cent.22
Redeemable annuities with a fixed income complied with the usury laws of the
church that essentially aimed at preventing a state of servitude of the debtor. In
later centuries (for example, in France in the seventeenth century and England in
the eighteenth century), refinancing at a lower interest rate was achieved by a
reduction of the coupon while keeping the face value of the loan unchanged.23 In
Castile, following the tradition established in the previous century, the interest
reduction kept the annual income constant and demanded from the lender an
augmentation of the capital of the loan, known as the crecimiento. A juro was
defined by the capital amount needed to generate 1,000 maravedis (mrs). For
example, ‘14,000 al millar’ means an interest of 7.14 per cent. In a crecimiento, the
holder of the juro was given the choice between either receiving its face value in
cash, or paying the difference with the new face value. In a reduction from 7.14 to
5 per cent, the holder of a juro that was ‘increased’ to 20,000 had to make a
payment of 6,000 in order to keep the juro. In such cases, the new face value would
be registered.24
The crecimiento may also have provided a commitment device against a forced
debt reduction, since a forced increase of a bond’s capital value is perhaps more
difficult to implement than a decrease of a bond’s coupon.25 No juro had its annual
income reduced during the reign of Philip II. Crecimientos are a central issue in the
interpretation of the resolution of the crises of 1575–7 and 1596–7.
20 The Netherlands did not have a central bond market at that time either. Issuances were at the local level as
in Castile; van Bochove, ‘Intermediaries’.
21 The fraction of juros al quitar was 76% in 1559, 82% in 1575, and about 90% at the end of the century;
Artola, La Hacienda, p. 88.
22 Andrés Díaz, El último decenio.
23 Chamley, ‘Interest reductions’.
24 The market value of old juros (that carry a high dividend ratio) depended on the long-term rate and on the
expectation about future crecimientos, in addition to local conditions.
25 In a similar sense, tontines were more vulnerable than life annuities and were indeed reduced to life annuities
by Joseph Marie Terray, Controller-General of Finances during the reign of Louis XV in France, in his debt
reduction of 1770.
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II
The funding of the domestic debt should, above all, have a stable basis. The
standard method of increasing credibility, since the creation of the public debt in
the Italian cities during the middle ages, has been an alignment between the debt
holders and the people who control and enforce the taxes that service the debt.26
What was good for a city-state could also be used by a state that included cities.
The Italian system was generalized in the sixteenth century to states that included
cities.27 In Castile, the system of ‘borrowing through cities’ had an ideal setting:
most of the Castilian realm was represented by 18 cities and their surrounding
regions, and negotiations between the Crown and the realm were centralized in the
Cortes.
The main tax in Castile was the alcabalas, a sales tax collected by tax farming
before 1536, with a nominal rate of 10 per cent (de facto a legal maximum).28 The
actual rate was much lower, possibly around 2 per cent.29 The Cortes of 1536
established the system of the encabezamiento general by which each city was com-
mitted to an annual lump-sum payment that was fixed for the following six years.
These amounts were adopted in the Cortes by majority voting. Each readjustment
of the encabezamientos would require protracted negotiations. After 1536, the
encabezamiento provided the most stable basis for servicing the juros.
The lack of a central administration to collect the alcabalas directly prevented
the central government from diverting revenues away from servicing the debt. It
thus enhanced the borrowing capability of the government. The delegation of tax
revenues and the debt service was a commitment device that enabled the Crown
to increase the domestic debt to a level that was unprecedented in the sixteenth
century.
Juros were administered by cities, but they were legal contracts between holders
and the Crown, rather than contracts between holders and cities. Hence, they
could be traded throughout the entire realm with registered sales and transfers.30
Because of the delegation of revenue collection, there was no centralized market
(as in eighteenth-century England) and it should not be surprising that the coupon
rates for apparently similar juros were not identical.
The alcalabas and the associated servicios (see below) represented the most
stable basis for the funding of the debt, but they were only part of the Crown’s
revenues. An overview of these revenues is presented in table 1 according to their
capacity for debt servicing.The table is in four parts, each defined by its reliability
for servicing the public debt. On the left-hand side are the ordinary revenues,
which provided a stable source of funding. At the top is the fixed contribution of
cities, which was determined in the Cortes, and provided the most reliable base.
Below are the taxes that were administered directly by the Crown (for example,
import duties and monopolies), which were less reliable. On the right-hand side
are the extraordinary revenues, which were of two types. At the top are the city
26 Pezzolo, ‘Government debts’.
27 For the Low Countries under Carlos V, see Tracy, Financial revolution, esp. pp. 71–108. In 1522, Francis I
issued the Rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris; Vührer, Histoire.
28 Zabala Aguirre, Las alcabalas, p. 57.
29 Artola, La Hacienda, p. 50.
30 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid (hereafter AHN), Consejos Juros, leg. 1733, fo. 7; AGS, Contaduría de
Mercedes, leg. 227.
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contributions, which were stable but had no permanent legal status and had to be
renewed by votes in the Cortes every few years. Below these are revenues that were
neither politically nor economically stable.
In the ordinary revenues, the customs and profits from regulated monopolies
were not controlled by the cities. Since the central government had no tax admin-
istration, and these taxes were collected at specific locations (for example, customs
and salt mines), it was relatively easy to subcontract their collection to local
entrepreneurs through tax farming. These revenues were under the direct control
of the central government and thus did not benefit from the special protection that
was given to taxes collected by the cities. They provided a base for debt funding,
but that base was not as stable as the encabezamientos: these taxes were under the
direct control of the central government, and they were subject to fluctuations in
trade and general economic activity and to the risk of default by the tax farmer.
Accordingly, they supported juros of lesser grade.
The extraordinary revenues, on the right-hand side of table 1, could not provide
a good source of funding for the long-term public debt. Few juros were written on
these revenues, at least in the sixteenth century, and they traded at a discount.
Between 1560 and 1575, some juros were funded by the revenues of the Casa de
la Contratación, a government agency that managed the silver revenues and was
directly controlled by the Crown.31 Not surprisingly, these juros were traded at a
significant discount. In this sense, there can be no meaningful relationship between
silver revenues and the servicing of the debt.
Servicios (servicio ordinario, servicio extraordinario, and millones) were similar to
the alcabalas.They were administered by the cities and their level was determined
by centralized negotiations by the Cortes at the same that the alcabalas were being
negotiated (see section V for 1575). However, the servicios, unlike the alcabalas,
were voluntary contributions by the cities and had a temporary status that had to
be renewed during these negotiations.They could not be used to service long-term
bonds. The evolution over time of these different revenue streams is presented in
figure 1.
III
The short-term debt was in contracts, asientos, with Genoese bankers, who were
the indispensable ‘moneyed men’ of Castile, the more so because there was no
Table 1. Types of revenue
Ordinary Share Extraordinary Share
Cortes Fixed contributions (alcabalas) 27% Temporary contributions 8%
Non-Cortes Taxes set by the Crown 24% Other revenues 22%
Silver from the Indies 19%
Notes: Shares of revenues varied over time. The table presents averages for the entire tenure of Philip II (1556–98). Temporary
contributions include servicio ordinario and extraordinario and the millones (which were in place only between 1591 and 1596).
Other revenues include arbitrios (occasional revenues) and church revenues (on average 17%). Negotiations in the Cortes were
on the two items of the first line in the table.
Sources: Gelabert, La bolsa del rey, pp. 385–6; Lorenzo Sanz, Comercio de España, pp. 263–72; Martín Acosta, El dinero americano;
Ulloa, La Hacienda Real, pp. 171–687; Zabala Aguirre, Las alcabalas, pp. 55–64.
31 Ruiz Martín, ‘Un expediente financiero’, pp. 40–5. 
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centralized financial market at that time.32 The asientos specified, in some but often
not exhaustive detail, payment obligations between the bankers and the Crown
(for example, date, place, currency, exchange rate, and interest rate). When the
asientos included loans, the average maturity was about two years (though some
contracts could last up to 10 years).When the exact dates for repayments were not
fixed, the asiento often specified an interest rate. In the period between 1570 and
1575, the usual rate was 12 per cent per annum. Contrary to some descriptions in
the literature, the greater share of asientos was not written into loans to pay the
army in Flanders.33 For example, in 1575, less than 40 per cent of the total
disbursements of asientos were in Flanders and about half were in Castile (with the
rest in Italy and Besançon).The large share of domestic transactions illustrates the
role of the Genoese bankers in capital markets within Castile (which was similar to
the role later played by ‘moneyed men’ in England).
Some asientos were collateralized by juros (juros de caución and juros de resguardo).
The collateral had two purposes: first, to serve as a collateral; second, in keeping
with the overall fiscal policy setting, when spending shocks turned out to be more
than transient, short-term loans could be converted into long-term loans. The
lender could then sell the collateral instead of receiving cash. Such a sale should
not be taken as a sign of failure from the Crown, but instead as part of an efficient
overall policy. It was standard practice for the Crown, in a stable regime, to pay
some asientos in juros.
32 Charles V had a special relationship with the Fuggers. Under Philip II, from 1561 on, the main players were
the Genoese bankers. They had the expertise to handle the complex transactions between Castile, the Nether-
lands, and Italy, and within Castile they operated through letters of exchange and other short-term contracts. For
the importance of the ‘moneyed men’, see the next section.
33 Conklin, ‘Theory of sovereign debt’, pp. 489–90.
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Figure 1. Revenues
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Under Charles V, the juros as collateral could be sold only if the Crown did not
meet the terms of the asiento (juros de caución). Starting in 1561, following an
initiative by the banker Juan Curiel de la Torre, some collaterals, called juros de
resguardo, could be sold by the banker provided that he returned a similar juro later
if the Crown met the payment schedule of the asiento.34 In this case, the service of
the juro that had been sold would be deducted from the liability of the Crown.The
system of the juros de resguardo enabled bankers to refinance asientos at a low
interest rate. That system increased the banker’s profitability. However, in the
context of the fragmented juros market, the system introduced some confusion in
the definition of the net debt of the Crown. It is therefore not surprising that the
crisis of 1575 was, among other things, an ‘information event’ in which the Crown
attempted to recalculate the liability it had accumulated since 1560, as actualized
at the average rate of asientos (12 per cent).35
IV
Expenditure in Castile was driven by wars and was highly variable. The standard
modern theory of public finance assumes a central government that minimizes tax
distortions through tax smoothing. Any surprise in expenditure should be met with
a frictionless adjustment of taxes to meet the intertemporal resource constraint. A
textbook illustration is presented by parliamentary England in the eighteenth
century (although it departed from that model during the NapoleonicWars).36 The
English method of debt financing became operational only after a long transition,
between 1690 and 1740, that has been called a ‘financial revolution’.37 Dickson has
emphasized that, even after the completion of that transition, the English govern-
ment could not issue large quantities of liabilities, both long- and short-term,
without the close collaboration of institutions such as the Bank of England and the
South Sea Company, and of skilled financiers.38
In Castile, as with all the governments at the time, the Crown had exclusive
authority over expenditure. Cities, however, controlled the best taxes for servicing
the debt and their contribution (encabezamiento) was set through collective bar-
gaining in the Cortes. The Cortes could not meet independently like a modern
Parliament. Instead, they had to be called by the Crown. No increase in the
encabezamiento could be carried out without a meeting of the Cortes and the
agreement of the cities. Negotiations with the cities would be protracted because
of divergent political interests between the cities and the Crown and because of
imperfect information between the Crown and the cities, between the Genoese
34 Ruiz Martín, ‘Las finanzas españolas’. During a brief period up to 1563, some asientos had as collateral juros
por acomodar that were similar to juros de resguardo; Carlos Morales, Felipe II, pp. 93–4.
35 In the modern theory of the debt contract (Townsend, ‘Optimal contracts’), the creditor can get information
on the debtor at some cost. The debt contract with a fixed interest rate is efficient because the creditor needs to
get this information only in the case of default. Such an event can be called an ‘information event’. In the case
of Philip II, the debtor also had imperfect information on the creditors as they traded in collaterals. Hence, there
was some efficiency in acquiring information about creditors only in the ‘information event’ of a suspension of
payments.There is no formal analysis of this situation of double asymmetric information in debt contracts in the
literature and it is beyond the scope of the present article.
36 Barro, ‘Government spending’.
37 Dickson, Financial revolution.
38 However, the interests that were represented by these institutions and people restricted the capability of the
government to conduct efficient reductions of the interest rate on the public debt; Chamley, ‘Interest reductions’.
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bankers and the Crown/cities, and between the cities themselves. The problem of
asymmetric information between the Crown and the realm was well known in all
feudal countries where the sovereign faced a constraint of ‘evident necessity’ and
had to justify taxation (in men or money) for wars. A contribution to the solution
of the information problem was found in the twelfth century in the Cortes of
Aragon,39 and in the thirteenth century in England.40
The Cortes did not have the power completely to oppose a tax increase, but they
could impose a cost on the Crown by reducing the amount of the tax increase, or
delay its implementation for a few years, as in the crisis of 1573–7. Revenues from
the encabezamiento and other ordinary taxes provided a ceiling on the service of the
juros that were of the highest grade. As long as the ceiling was not reached, the
Crown could issue more juros. In that regime, the Crown used the short-term
unfunded asientos, which had a rate about twice the rate of the funded juros (about
12 per cent against 6 per cent), in order to absorb transitory shocks and fund
transfers abroad. However, there was no significant accumulation of short-term
debt.
Such a regime was in place in the years that followed the settlements of 1560
and 1577. It is illustrated in figure 2 by the evolution of the service of the juros
(called the situado), and the level of ordinary revenues, as described in table 1.
These revenues are the sum of the encabezamientos that were negotiated in the
Cortes and of the farmed revenues (including monopolies), which grew between
1560 and 1570 (figure 1), but seem to have reached their capacity in 1573.
When the service of long-term debt neared the ceiling of the ordinary revenues,
as in the early 1570s and the late 1590s (figure 2), refinancing the asientos through
39 O’Callaghan, Cortes.
40 For an analysis of the role of asymmetric information in Magna Carta (1215), see Green, ‘Emergence’.
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juros became more difficult and the Crown initiated negotiations with the cities.41
During this phase, asientos accumulated. Before the suspensions of payments in
1557, 1575, and 1596, the amounts of outstanding asientos, gross of the collaterals,
were 7.5, 15, and 7 million ducats, respectively. Each of these crises is represented
by a vertical line. The first two, in 1557 and 1560, are actually two steps of the
same crisis. At the end of each crisis, all the outstanding asientos were converted
into juros.
Each crisis formally began with a suspension of payments on the short-term
debt to the foreign bankers. (In 1575, this came as a surprise to the bankers.) In
a situation of asymmetric information, a suspension of payments may be an
additional argument for the Crown to convince the cities of the ‘evident necessity’
of more funds. In 1575, the suspension of payments also provided an opportunity
to review dealings in the collaterals of the asientos.
A crisis after a suspension of payments lasted until the Crown settled first with
the cities, and then with the bankers in a final document called the Medio General.
(There was no Medio General in the resolution of the 1560 crisis.)The bankers may
have taken a debt reduction, but the empirical evidence about the exact amount of
debt reduction is not clear at this point. The cities accepted higher taxes in the
settlements of 1560 and 1577. In 1598, taxes were not increased but the interest
rate was reduced on some juros. However, that settlement should be viewed as a
prelude to the next negotiations of 1607, after the death of Philip II, as the
temporary settlement of 1558 preceded that of 1560. A key feature of each
settlement was the conversion of all the asientos, net of any debt reduction, into
long-term juros.That feature has been neglected in the literature but reinforces our
interpretation of the debt policy of the kingdom of Castile. We now analyse the
three crises in more detail.
V
The events of 1557–60 must be considered as one single, long financial crisis. At
the beginning of his reign in 1556, Philip II inherited from his father, Charles V, a
debt of 7.5 million ducats in asientos.42 He ordered a review of the accounts and
began negotiations with some bankers to refinance asientos into juros. However, the
service of the debt was reaching the total amount of ordinary revenues, leaving no
room for more juros (figure 2). On 17 April 1557, Philip II declared his first
suspension of payments.
The decree was not intended to repudiate the asientos, even partially. It declared
a conversion of some asientos into juros at 5 per cent—the bankers could sell these
on the market.43 That conversion did not apply to the Fuggers who were, at the
41 Because of the decentralization of the juros, their service in some towns may be up to the revenue constraint
before the aggregate service reaches the aggregate ordinary revenues (fig. 3).
42 Carlos Morales, Felipe II, p. 38. See also a report from March 1557 (AGS, Estado, leg. 121, fo. 61) that is
referenced by Toboso Sánchez, La deuda pública, p. 115. The computation of the short-term debt is always
approximate. Asientos were not traded in a market and the indebtedness on a particular contract at a particular
point of time depends on assumptions about the interest rates and the exchange rates. There is no such thing as
‘the interest rate’, in today’s economies and a fortiori, in the fragmented capital market of Castile.
43 Ruiz Martín, ‘Un expediente financiero’, p. 11, reports that for the year 1552, 47% of the juros were
redeemable. In that type, 47.6% paid a rate of 7.14%, 5.2% a rate of 5.5% and 30% a rate of 5%.The remaining
16% paid other rates.
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time, some of the main creditors, and it did not address the main problem, which
was the ceiling on ordinary revenues. The second part of the policy was the
promulgation on 30 April 1558, by the regent in Castile, the princess Doña Juana,
of a new tax on wool exports. New customs were also created between Portugal
and Castile on 30 January 1559.44
Genoese bankers had accepted the juros at 5 per cent in order to settle the
negotiations. However, juros at 7.14 per cent were obviously selling faster than juros
at 5 per cent. The bankers therefore proposed to undertake the conversion into
juros at a rate between 7.14 and 10 per cent in the following years, while they
granted new asientos. That policy, which was probably viewed as a stopgap, was
initiated by Nicolao de Grimaldo in May 1558 and followed by all other bankers
between 1558 and 1560.
When Philip II returned from Flanders to Castile for the first time as king on 8
September 1559, he intended to put the finances of the Crown in order. He
summoned the Cortes in Toledo and ordered a general review of the budget. The
stock of juros was 21.7 million ducats, with an interest service of 1.5 million.45
The debt in asientos was 4.5 million, as the 1557 decree had refinanced only
some of the short-term debt.46 Negotiations would last for the entire year. On
14 November 1560, the king declared his second suspension of payment on
the asientos.
The conversion from asientos to juros was made possible because the 1559–60
Cortes agreed to increase the alcabalas by 37 per cent, effective from 1562. All
asientos were then converted into juros. In the current state of knowledge, it is
doubtful that the first suspension of payments of Philip II generated any default on
the asientos. There was no Medio General after the suspensions of payments of
1557–60. After the settlements, which were made separately between individual
bankers and the Crown, the signing of new asientos resumed rapidly.47 From 1562
onwards, juros de resguardo would be issued on the new alcabalas.
The crisis of 1573–7 was a pivotal moment for the finances of Philip II. As in
other crises, the interaction between the Crown and the cities should take centre
stage, and that power game began well before the suspension of payments in
1575.48
Following the Dutch revolt in the late 1560s, military expenditures increased
rapidly during the early 1570s, both in Flanders and on the sea (the Battle of
Lepanto occurred in 1571). As revenues from the Indies had decreased during this
period (see figure 1), the deficit increased. The encabezamiento had been fixed, in
nominal terms, in 1562. During the 1560s, the Crown increased the ordinary
revenues through higher rates on existing taxes and through the introduction of
44 Ulloa, La Hacienda Real, p. 253.
45 Pulido Bueno, La Corte, p. 76.
46 Neri, Uomini d’affari, p. 83.
47 Some asientos were written with non-tradable collaterals (juros de caución) at 7.14% (14,000 al millar). At the
same time, for one million ducats of the pre-1560 debt that had been paid in juros at 5% in the 1560 decree, the
rate was increased to 7.14%. The episode illustrates that the amount of debt reduction was raised in later
negotiations with the bankers. One cannot take the terms of a Medio General for an accurate estimation of the
actual debt reduction.The gradual conversion of juros on the Casa de la Contratación into juros of higher grade was
implemented through contract clauses in new asientos; Ulloa, La Hacienda Real, p. 763.
48 For the historical descriptions, see reference works: Fortea Pérez, Monarquía y Cortes, pp. 42–88; idem,
‘¿Impuestos o servicios?’.
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new taxes and new regulated monopolies.49 Figure 2 illustrates the rise of these
revenues.Their growth stopped in the early 1570s for two reasons. First, there were
limited opportunities for an increase in the tax base, or in the existing rates.
Second, most of these revenues were related to trade, which suffered after the
beginning of the Dutch revolt. In any case, these ordinary revenues were farmed
out and could not support juros at the lowest rate, of the same type as those that
were funded by the encabezamientos.
It was obvious that the service of the debt was absorbing most of the Crown’s
ordinary revenues (figure 2). As juros were issued against revenues from cities, the
local constraints on these revenues became effective in some cities; for example, in
Burgos and Murcia (figure 3).
The situation called for an increase in tax revenues for the funding of the public
debt, and therefore it was necessary for the Cortes to meet. The crisis developed
in two phases. First, from 1573 to 1575, the Crown made a number of attempts to
obtain more revenues from the cities.When that process failed, the Crown prom-
ulgated through a decree, in September 1575, a stop on the short-term debt
payments, and conducted negotiations on two fronts with the cities and the
bankers.That second phase lasted until the final settlement, first with the cities at
the end of November 1577, and immediately afterwards with the bankers in the
Medio General.50
The crisis began in April 1573, when Philip II summoned the Cortes and, as in
previous negotiations in 1559, proposed a 30-year plan to get rid of the public debt
(desempeño):51 higher taxes would generate a surplus for 20 years and, for the last
10 years, the burden would be reduced to finish off the remaining debt. Initially,
the cities accepted the general idea of the plan, but they continued to negotiate
through the Cortes. No stable agreement could be achieved without the formal
approval of all the cities.
While negotiations dragged on, Philip II tried a second plan in December 1573:
a new flour tax would be created that would be applicable without exemption. In
this way, the increased tax burden would be evenly distributed throughout the
Spanish realm. The flour tax, even at a low rate, would have provided a huge
extension of the tax base.52 The cities strongly opposed the tax and insisted instead
on a commitment to a permanent reduction of taxation in the future, and to a stop
on the sales of offices.53 The Cortes were suspended at the end of 1573 to enable
the delegates to return to their cities for consultation. Heated discussions delayed
the resumption of the Cortes until June 1574.
Each delegate came back with special ad hoc demands. As a further complica-
tion, taxation of the clergy required a papal decree. During the summer of 1574,
other issues were discussed, such as the formal transfer of the juros in quotas to the
cities, which would then be free to choose how to service or redeem them, or the
49 In 1559, the customs tax base was extended. The import tax rate from the Americas was raised in 1566.
Additional taxes on wool exports were introduced in 1558 and 1566. After 1564, a regulated monopoly was
introduced to increase the revenues from the salt tax up to 0.2 million ducats (1/6 of the alcabalas). In 1563,
another monopoly was introduced on the production of mercury.
50 Lovett, ‘Castilian bankruptcy’, p. 910; idem, ‘General Settlement’, p. 19.
51 Fortea Pérez, Monarquía y Cortes, p. 45.
52 The tax could have yielded between three and four million ducats; ibid., pp. 418–20.
53 Furthermore, they were sceptical regarding the Crown’s commitment to a budget surplus—a claim no more
credible in the sixteenth century than it would be in the twenty-first.
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redistribution of the tax burden between the cities. These were particularly con-
cerned with the unfunded debt of the asientos and the role of the Genoese
bankers.54 The strong popular sentiment against asentistas, similar to the reaction
today against banks, was used in the following year by Philip II in his decree by
which payments to the bankers were suspended. Unable to find an agreement, the
Crown changed strategy.
The Crown then abandoned the pretence of the desempeño, although the cities
continued to insist on it,55 and invoked instead the large increase in war expendi-
ture, and the imbalance between the encabezamiento at its 1562 level compared to
54 The city of Salamanca instructed its delegates to reject the redemption plan unless a commitment was made
to throw out of the kingdom all foreigners who dealt with asientos; Fortea Pérez, Monarquía y Cortes, p. 62.
55 Ibid., p. 73.
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Figure 3. Service of juros and funding taxes (encabezamiento) for Burgos, the region
of Murcia, and Cadiz (in thousands of ducats)
Sources: Juros service: AHN, Consejos Juros, leg. 1777. Encabezamiento: Zabala Aguirre, Las alcabalas, p. 60; Archivo General de
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the increase in other tax revenues. During these protracted negotiations, the gap
between the ordinary revenues and the interest service of the juros continued to
close.
On 20 September 1574, Philip II tripled the encabezamiento general from 1.2 to
3.7 million.56 The policy was extraordinary in its timing and amount. All previous
levels of the encabezamientos in 1536, 1547, 1552, and 1562 had been determined
during meetings of the Cortes. Without the cities’ agreement the tax could not
have been expected to be stable. Legally, it was just another extraordinary levy.
Despite Philip II’s efforts to employ a special task force of ‘administrators, tax-
farmers and public inspectors’,57 it is doubtful that the decree of 1574 was actually
implemented.58 Why Philip II insisted on such a large increase is not clear.
Obviously, a smaller increase would have provided sufficient room for greater debt
service—as was the case for another 10 years after the final settlement of 1577.
Since the encabezamiento had not changed since 1562 with a fall in real value of
12 per cent, and since the cities eventually accepted, in 1577, a doubling of the
encabezamiento, it is clear that if the issue had been a liquidity crisis the Crown
could have obtained agreement on a modest tax increase. However, the Crown had
decided from 1573 onwards to obtain a large increase of revenues and it was
engaged in a power play with the cities.
Philip II signed a decree that put a stop to payments to the Genoese bankers on
1 September 1575, following the arrival of the fleet on 11 August 1575.59 During
1574, new asientos had been issued to an amount of 6.219 million ducats, close to
the record level of 1572 (6.248 million ducats).That total included 2.658 million
ducats to be paid in Flanders, about 3 million ducats in Castile, and the rest in
Italy.60 A complete list of all the asientos signed between January and the suspen-
sion of payments is presented in table 2.
During the eight months before the suspension in September 1575, Genoese
bankers signed new asientos for 4.8 million ducats, the highest amount within such
a short interval. Between March and July, Nicolao de Grimaldo made the most
important loans, by far, for a total amount of 1.9 million ducats. The first one
(1.3 million ducats) was provided for disbursements during 1575 and repayments
by the king during the same year in three tranches after each four-month period
(37.5 per cent for each of the first two). The short maturity of that loan shows
that Grimaldo was prudent. All bankers must have been cognizant of the financial
situation of the Crown. As moneyed men, they had close ties with the government
in Castile. Some may even have participated in financial committees of the gov-
ernment.The cities would resist an increase in the alcabalas, but the bankers were
confident that there was a base for higher taxes and many of the asientos during the
spring of 1575 were written on the promise of higher alcabalas from 1575 onwards.
The situation is easy to picture in the context of the current lending crisis in
56 It was expected that a large part of the increase would come from an extension of the tax base to include
bread, wine, fruit, and agricultural products that had so far been exempted de facto, and would now be taxed at
about 4 %; ibid., p. 71.
57 Jago, ‘Philip II’, p. 31; Hernández Esteve, Establecimiento de la partida doble, pp. 164–5.
58 Thompson, ‘Castile’, p. 169, claims that revenues could even have decreased, in reaction to the tax jump.
59 Revenues from the Indies in 1575 were 0.9 million ducats, about a 50% increase on the average of the
previous three years.
60 AGS, Contadurías Generales, leg. 86.
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Greece. The bankers knew that the situation was risky, but they would not have
made these record loans in the spring of 1575 if they had anticipated the suspen-
sion in September.
After Philip II had given a clear signal in the decree both of his need for more
revenues and of his toughness towards the resented asentistas, he again called the
Cortes to begin negotiations in November.61 The business of the Cortes was to
readjust three types of taxes, the encabezamiento of the alcabalas, the ordinary
service, and the extraordinary service. The usual sequence was to agree on the
servicio ordinario and the servicio extraordinario first, and then to bargain on the
main item, the encabezamiento.This time, however, the Cortes, in order to increase
their bargaining power, reversed the order and requested first a renegotiation of
the 1574 decree (which had tripled the encabezamiento), before voting on the two
services.
Negotiations were very slow. Why did Philip II reject his impatient aides’ facile
advice to use force? We think that he had at least two motives. First, he knew that
he had to play a political game with the cities that represented the realm, and that
the game was likely to be repeated. Second, Philip II was rational and he probably
anticipated the eventual consequences of the suspension of payments for the credit
market and the trading activities of the cities. We discuss this issue briefly below.
It took almost a year, until August 1576, to agree to move the servicio ordinario
up the agenda, before the encabezamiento. Then the negotiations dragged on
for more than another year, until 29 October 1577. In previous adjustments
of the encabezamiento, increases had been roughly proportional across cities.
For the contract of 1577, however, the shares of some cities jumped up: Seville
from 10.2 per cent in 1557 to 17.5 per cent in 1577, and Toledo from 5.8 to
7.6 per cent, while Granada’s share dropped from 9.2 to 5 per cent.62 After the
agreement on the encabezamiento, voting on the servicio extraordinario was accel-
erated and a final agreement was reached in the following month.
For the Crown and also for the Genoese bankers, the suspension of payments
did not mean a default to the bankers. Before the end of the year, the Crown set
the principle that all the debt would be paid at 12 per cent. The question was,
which debt? Recent literature has emphasized the role of bankruptcy as the
outcome of an efficient loan contract that saves the cost of information that must
be acquired by the lender.63 In 1575, one could argue that the need for more
information was on the side of the borrower, Philip II. A simple theoretical model
that captures the complexity of the network of asientos and their related side-
contracts is beyond the scope of this article. Because of these intertwined side-
contracts, especially on the collaterals, there was a dire need for a review of all the
contracts. That review had to be comprehensive because of the connections
between loans and collaterals in juros, and in order to achieve an orderly conversion
of all short-term asientos into long-term juros.
Because the bankers substituted some of the asiento’s collaterals (juros de
resguardo) with juros of lower grade, the liabilities of the different parties were
difficult to assess.This justified the Crown’s creation of a commission to review all
asientos that had been signed since 14 November 1560: 296 contracts with 66
61 Fortea Pérez, Monarquía y Cortes, p. 248.
62 Zabala Aguirre, Las alcabalas, pp. 55–98, and esp. tab. 9, p. 64.
63 Townsend, ‘Optimal contracts’.
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people (35 with Nicolao de Grimaldo, 34 with Lucian Centurion, 32 with Lorenzo
Spinola, and so on). The balance of each active asiento was computed by bring-
ing past payments up to the current date with the standard interest rate of
12 per cent.64
The Crown and the bankers agreed on the amount of 15.2 million ducats in the
early spring of 1577, as stated in the final settlement. The larger part of the debt
was not in unpaid arrears, but in repayments that were contractually scheduled for
the future.We have examined all the asientos that were initiated between 1570 and
1575 (and some before 1570), and extracted those that specify contracts after
1575.The total amount of the payments scheduled after 1575 exceeded 12 million
ducats. Given the average maturity of these remaining liabilities, an approximate
estimate of the present value of the scheduled repayments is about 10 million
ducats. Arrears would then represent about 5 million ducats.65
The terms of the final settlement between the Crown and the bankers had been
set in March 1577, but the signing of the settlement had to wait, with no significant
change, for another nine months until the end of the negotiations in the Cortes.
The long delay between the agreement with the bankers in March 1577 and the
signature in December after the closing of the Cortes is additional evidence that
the difficult negotiations between the Crown and the cities was the major cause of
the suspension of payments. Immediately after the agreement in the Cortes, the
Medio General was signed between the Crown and the bankers on 5 December
1577.
A powerful incentive for the cities to settle was the adverse impact of the crisis
on the domestic credit market and trade.We have seen that a large fraction of the
asientos was internal to Castile. Like the moneyed men of eighteenth-century
England, the Rothschilds in the Napoleonic era, or modern bankers today, the
main role of Genoese bankers was to underwrite loans, and not to lend on their
own funds. It is very likely that the funds for the asientos that were disbursed in
Castile came from Castile.
The suspension of payments on the asientos also put a stop to the main fairs at
Medina del Campo. They eventually resumed, in 1578, but they had lost their
pre-eminence in the network of commercial fairs and never regained it.
In the settlement, the debt of 15.2 million ducats was divided into two parts:
10.4 and 4.8 million ducats, respectively.66 The first part, 10.4 million ducats,
corresponded to juros: 8 million ducats were paid by juros de resguardo that had
been written at 7.14 per cent and were reduced to 5 per cent. The remaining
2.4 million ducats corresponded to juros written on the Casa de la Contratación
and were accounted for at their market value, 55 per cent of the face value. The
second part of the debt, 4.8 million ducats, was subdivided into two parts.
Two-thirds were paid by juros on salt at the rate of 3.3 per cent (30,000 al millar).
For the remaining third, the holders of asientos were compensated by the monetary
equivalent of property rights on individuals (vasallos) and of the granting of legal
powers (jurisdicciones) on some church territories that had been allowed by a bull
64 Carlos Morales, Felipe II, p. 164.
65 The existence of arrears is also confirmed by the terms of some asientos signed before 1575 that included
clauses for the payments of arrears.
66 We use rounded numbers. The Medio General specified exact numbers that can be found in the literature;
Carlos Morales, Felipe II, p. 178. Here, the exact amount is 15,184,464 ducats.
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of Gregory XIII on 6 April 1574. The values of these effects were computed with
discount rates at 6.5 and 2.35 per cent (16,000 and 42,500 al millar) depending
where they were situated in Castile.
We emphasized in the introduction that some details of the settlement with the
bankers are critical for its interpretation and for the evaluation of any debt
reduction. As shown in the description of the juros, the reduction of the interest
rate from 7 to 5 per cent could not be a default, contrary to previous literature
cited above.We also noted previously that the reference to a unique interest rate on
juros would be ahistorical because of the fragmented credit market.The reduction
of the interest on old juros through the crecimiento necessarily implied the coexist-
ence of juros with different interest rates that had different expectations of redemp-
tion and were arbitraged by the market.The actual interest rate on juros depended
on the marketability of new juros. Ruiz Martin has provided some evidence of juros
at 5 per cent that traded during the period of 1570 to 1575 for 17,000 al millar,
which is equivalent to a rate of 5.88 per cent.67 In the archives of Simancas, there
are numerous documents that show sales of juros at 5 per cent, or even lower (see
below), throughout the 1570s.68
After the signing of the Medio General, the Crown issued a number of orders to
specify the details of the payments. Under some special provisions, bankers could
be in charge of applying the crecimiento to some juros and recovering the proceed-
ings from reimbursements for asientos.
With regard to the second part of the debt (4.8 million ducats), the terms of the
Medio General do not enable us to have a precise evaluation of the terms of the
settlement. The rate of the juros written on the salt tax was equal to 3.33 per cent
(30,000 al millar).There is some indication that the ‘market rate’ of such juros was
less than 5 per cent, but this issue is yet to be researched. If we apply the same
discount to the other third of the debt of 4.8 million ducats, the upper bound for
the reduction of the 1575 short-term debt is equal to 1.6 million, that is, 11 per
cent of the total.69
In 1588, the disaster of the Great Armada was apparent to all, without asym-
metric information on the revenue needs of the Crown (as mentioned in the record
of the 1589 Cortes). Although the debt service was far below the ordinary revenues
(figure 2), the cities quickly granted a special tax. Patriotism trumped tax smooth-
ing. It was levied like the alcabalas under the encabezamiento, but the cities insisted
on the specific purpose of the tax, which was given a different name, the servicio de
millones, and the payment was limited to a term of six years.
When the millones ended in 1596, as scheduled, the service of the long-term
debt, which had gradually increased since the previous settlement, had reached the
level of the funding revenues (figure 2). The Crown first attempted to renew the
millones, under a different name (the cuentos).70 After no majority agreement could
be reached in the Cortes, the government abandoned the project, leaving its
implementation to the next king, Philip III.
67 Ruiz Martín, ‘Las finanzas españolas’.
68 For more details, see the working paper and data at http://people.bu.edu/chamley/papers/documents/
juros1572.pdf.
69 Some decrees after 1577 compensated bankers for losses that they had incurred in the settlement of 1577.
70 Fortea Pérez, Monarquía y Cortes, p. 155.
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As in the previous crisis of 1575, the crisis of 1596 was not caused by a liquidity
problem but by the refusal of the cities to raise taxes.This imposed a ceiling on the
domestic debt.71 If the ratio between the service of the long-term debt and the
funding revenues had been the same as in the early 1590s, no crisis would have
occurred.
The decree was published on 29 November 1596, again to the surprise of the
asentistas and to the satisfaction of the cities.72The total debt recognized by the king
was 7 million ducats.73 Unlike 1575, the suspension of payments to the Genoese
bankers was not used as a device to increase ordinary revenues. Economic activity
had stopped growing since the 1580s, which explains the fact that the ordinary
revenues were stationary (figure 1). The Crown and the Cortes probably felt that
higher domestic taxation would be difficult to enforce. On the other hand, interest
rates on juros had decreased since the previous financial crisis. The conversion of
asientos into juros was achieved by a combination of interest reduction and issuance
of juros on some available ordinary revenues that were less stable.74 We have
described previously how interest reductions through crecimientos were not defaults.
VI
The fiscal system of Philip II was much more ingenious than previous literature
suggests.We have shown how it was adapted to the constraints of its time and that
its evaluation according to the standards of twenty-first-century economies can
lead to serious misinterpretation.The main achievement of Philip II’s government
was to mobilize large financial resources by transforming the apparent weakness of
the kingdom’s fragmented political and economic institutions into a strength.This
allowed the king to build the domestic public debt to something akin to that of
modern magnitude.
Philip II’s suspensions of payments were not caused by liquidity problems but
were part of the overall efficiency of the system.Thompson, who is an exception in
the literature, was the first to express that point of view.75 To apply the expression
‘serial defaulter’ to Philip II is thus an error of interpretation. Furthermore,
evidence about the actual dealings between the government (Tesoro General) and
the Genoese bankers seems to indicate that a significant part of alleged reductions
were transactions at prices not far from market values. An exact computation of the
actual debt reduction would require the examination of documents in the years
after the crisis resolutions and is thus beyond the scope of the present paper.
Many aspects of the finances of Castile under Philip II, large and small, are yet
to be examined. The archives in Simancas contain a large amount of information
that will be useful for this task. In future work, the fiscal system of Philip II should
71 The shortfall of the millones (1.33 million ducats) was compensated for by the high silver revenues, 6.2
million and 3.5 million ducats in 1595 and 1596, compared to an average of 1.225 million for 1591–4 (fig. 1).
72 Ulloa, La Hacienda Real, p. 820.
73 Sanz Ayán, ‘Procedimientos’, p. 30, gives a figure of 7 million ducats, while Ulloa, La Hacienda Real, p. 823,
gives a figure of 7,831,251 ducats.
74 See above, n. 67.
75 ‘This very periodicity [of the fiscal crises] suggests that rather than the manifestation of “crisis” these
“bankruptcies” were an integral part of the financial system of the Monarchy. The term “bankruptcy” can be
misleading’; Thompson, ‘Castile’, p. 160.
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also be integrated with the history of political institutions and studies by historians
who highlight the high degree of autonomy of the cities in the kingdom of Castile.
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